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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 10 NATO 07837

ERATION." BUT WHAT KIND OF "COOPERATION" DOES NATO MEAN?
IT MEANS FAR MORE THAN STANDARDIZATION AND INTEROPERABILITY.
WE ALSO NEED GREATER HARMONIZATION OF DOCTRINE, TACTICS AND
PROCEDURES, MORE COMMONALITY IN LOGISTIC SUPPORT SYSTEMS,
MORE JOINT TRAINING AND SCHOOLING, MORE COMBINED PLANNING
AND PROGRAMMING OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION, AND THE LIKE.
INDEED, ACHIEVING THESE THINGS IS MORE LIKELY TO DRIVE
ULTIMATE STANDARDIZATION THAN VICE VERSA, BECAUSE IN
GENERAL THEY ARE PROBABLY EASIER TO ACHIEVE AND WILL PROMOTE
LATER STANDARDIZATION. BECAUSE WE MUST THINK IN THIS
LARGER FRAME, "RATIONALIZATION" IS A BETTER UMBRELLA
RUBRIC.

- BUT STANDARDIZATION AND INTEROPERABILITY TOO ARE INDIS-
PENSABLE TO AN OPTIMALLY BALANCE COALITION POSTURE. WE
SIMPLY CAN'T ACHIEVE IT AT POLITICALLY FEASIBLE COST UNTIL
WE GET GREATER EQUIPMENT AND MUNITIONS COMMONALITY OR
INTERCHANGEABILITY. HOWEVER, THIS IS NOT SOMETHING WHICH
CAN BE DEALT WITH SEPARATELY FROM OTHER ASPECTS OF NATO'S
DEFENSE POSTURE AS A DISCRETE PROBLEM AREA. RATHER IT MUST
BECOME AN INTEGRAL PART OF EACH R&D AND SYSTEMS ACQUISITION
DECISION IF WE ARE TO GET CONCRETE RESULTS. S/I AND THE
TWO-WAY STREET MUST BECOME KEY R&D AND ACQUISITION PARA-
METERS. HENCE THIS PAPER WILL FOCUS RATHER ON HOW TO
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NATOIZE THE R&D AND SYSTEMS ACQUISITION PROCESS -- AND
DRIVE IT TOWARD COMMONALITY.
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- THE TIME IS RIPE TO DO SO. THERE HAS BEEN AN ENCOURAG-

ING EVOLUTION IN ATTITUDES OVER RECENT YEARS. IT IS NOW WIDELY RECOGNIZED THAT NATO CANNOT ACHIEVE A CREDIBLE DETERRENT POSTURE AT POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE COST WITHOUT A MUCH HIGHER DEGREE OF COMMONALITY. THIS DAWNING RECOGNITION HAS RESULTED IN INCREASED ATTENTION TO GREATER "ALLIANCE COOPERATION" (AS IT IS CALLED IN NATO'S MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE), STANDARDIZATION, INTEROPERABILITY, HARMONIZED ARMAMENTS PLANNING, SPECIALIZATION. THIS INCREASED ATTENTION TO ALLIANCE COOPERATION WAS ENDORSED BY THE NEW US ADMINISTRATION, WHEN IT ISSUED THE US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE 2010.6 ON S/I.

- BUT SO FAR ALL THIS IS POLICY NOT PUT TO THE TEST OF PERFORMANCE. ALL WE HAVE AT THIS POINT IS GENERAL CONSENSUS ON A PERCEIVED NEED, WITHOUT AS YET MUCH IDEA OF HOW TO CARRY IT INTO EFFECT. RHETORIC (ANOTHER TERM FOR BROAD POLICY STATEMENTS) IS NOT ENOUGH. WE ARE ALREADY IN DANGER OF LOSING CREDIBILITY WITH THE POLITICAL LEADERS AND THE MEDIA UNLESS WE FOLLOW UP OUR BOLD RHETORIC WITH ENOUGH HIGHLY VISIBLE SPECIFICS TO SHOW THAT WE MEAN WHAT WE SAY.

I. WHAT ARE THE REAL DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM?

- A FIRST ESSENTIAL STEP IS TO CLARIFY WHAT WE'RE TALKING ABOUT. THE ESCALATING RHETORIC ABOUT STANDARDIZATION AND THE TWO-WAY STREET HAS SPAWNED A LOT OF SIMPLISTIC AND OFTEN MISLEADING MYTHOLOGY. TO OVERSIMPLIFY, IT IS THAT "STANDARDIZATION" ALONE WILL SOLVE MOST OF OUR PROBLEMS. THE MEDIA HAVE CONTRIBUTED GREATLY TO THIS OVERSIMPLIFICATION.
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CATION. BUT STANDARDIZATION IS NOT A PANACEA. IT IS NOT THE SOLUTION TO ALL OF NATO'S DEFENSE PROBLEMS; IT IS NOT EVEN THE "HEART" OF A RATIONALIZATION EFFORT. MANY OTHER IMPORTANT ASPECTS ARE NOT ONLY PROBABLY EASIER OF SOLUTION BUT CUMULATIVELY JUST AS SIGNIFICANT IN THEIR IMPACT. NOR IS STANDARDIZATION VITAL ACROSS THE BOARD. WHILE STANDARDIZATION OF MAJOR SYSTEMS IS GETTING ALL THE PUBLICITY, BECAUSE MAJOR END ITEMS ARE HIGHLY VISIBLE, INTEROPERABILITY OF C3, HIGH CONSUMPTION MUNITIONS AND FUEL MAY HAVE FAR GREATER MILITARY PAYOFF.

- MOREOVER, EARLY STANDARDIZATION IS A CONTRADICTION IN TERMS. IT CAN'T BE ACHIEVED AT ANY EARLY DATE. WE CAN'T GET IT WITH PRESENT SYSTEMS, OR EVEN SYSTEMS FAR ALONG IN DEVELOPMENT, SINCE THESE REPRESENT SUNK COSTS WHICH NATIONS WILL BE RELUCTANT TO CROSS OFF. HOW TO DIVIDE UP THIRD COUNTRY SALES WILL BE ANOTHER DIFFICULT PROBLEM TO OVERCOME. SO WE CAN'T COUNT ON QUICK RESULTS. HENCE STANDARDIZATION WILL NOT DRIVE NATO-IZATION. THE OPPOSITE

IS FAR MORE LIKELY TO BE TRUE. OTHER ASPECTS OF COMMON-ALITY ARE FAR MORE LIKELY TO DRIVE EVENTUAL STANDARDIZATION THAN THE REVERSE (OF COURSE, THIS WILL VARY IN EACH PARTICULAR INSTANCE).

- NOR WILL STANDARDIZATION SAVE A LOT OF MONEY, AT LEAST IN THE SHORT RUN. WHAT WOULD SAVE THE MOST -- SINGLE COUNTRY R&D AND SINGLE SOURCE PROCUREMENT FOR THE WHOLE ALLIANCE -- IS PRECISELY THE SORT OF SPECIALIZATION WHICH, HOWEVER EFFICIENT, IS LEAST LIKELY TO BE ADOPTED IN MOST CASES. CONSORTIUM OR CO-PRODUCTION, THE MOST LIKELY FORM, IS MORE EXPENSIVE, THOUGH STILL CHEAPER THAN GOING IT

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ALONE. IN FACT STANDARDIZATION OR EVEN INTEROPERABILITY DOES NOT NECESSARILY EQUATE TO BUYING ABROAD. IT COULD BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT ANY OFFSHORE PROCUREMENT, BY EACH NATION DESIGNING TO COMMON STANDARDS AND PRODUCING STANDARDIZED EQUIPMENT UNDER LICENSE ON ITS OWN.

- IF THE EMERGING MYTHOLOGY THAT EARLY STANDARDIZATION AND EQUAL TWO-WAY ARMS TRAFFIC ARE THE KEY CRITERIA OF NATO SUCCESS BECOME FIRMLY IMPLANTED, IT COULD BE SERIOUSLY COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. BECAUSE OF NATIONAL VESTED INTERESTS, STANDARDIZATION IS THE HARDEST MOUNTAIN OF ALL FOR NATO TO CLIMB. THUS WE SHOULD NOT SET OUR SIGHTS TOO HIGH, OR STRESS TOO HEAVILY THIS ONE ASPECT OF ALL THAT WE'RE SEEKING TO ACCOMPLISH. AVOIDING THIS DANGER IS IMPORTANT TO SOLVING THE PROBLEM.

A. HENCE INTEROPERABILITY IS A MORE REALIZABLE NEAR-TERM GOAL THAN STANDARDIZATION. FOR ALL THE REASONS GIVEN ABOVE

BROAD STANDARDIZATION WILL BE SO HARD TO ACHIEVE IN PRACTICE (WITH OBVIOUS EXCEPTIONS) THAT FOR THE NEAR AND MID-TERM INTEROPERABILITY WILL HAVE HIGHER PAYOFF. IT IS QUICKER AND EASIER TO ACHIEVE -- A HALFWAY HOUSE WHICH WILL IN ITSELF PROMOTE FULL STANDARDIZATION LATER. FOR EXAMPLE, IF NATO STANDARDIZES KEY MUNITIONS, THIS WILL INEVITABLY

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ENCOURAGE STANDARDIZATION OF DELIVERY SYSTEMS TOO. THIS IS THE PRACTICAL VIEW OF THE MAJOR NATO COMMANDERS TOO. IN SHORT, IT MAKES PRACTICAL SENSE FOR NATO TO FOCUS LARGELY ON INTEROPERABILITY AND INTERCHANGEABILITY, ESPECIALLY OF KEY MUNITIONS AND COMPONENTS, AS A MAJOR GOAL.

B. WE CAN JUSTIFY S/I MORE READILY ON THE BASIS OF MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS THAN ON ECONOMIC GROUNDS.

- GIVEN THE ABOVE FACTS OF LIFE, OUR STRONGEST ARGUMENT FOR COMMONALITY IS SHEER MILITARY COST-EFFECTIVENESS. ITS CHIEF JUSTIFICATION SHOULD BE THAT IT WILL PRODUCE A SUPERIOR COALITION DETERRENT AND WARFIGHTING CAPABILITY WITHIN LIKELY NATO BUDGET CONSTRAINTS. MOREOVER, TO THE EXTENT THAT WE CAN OVERCOME THE WASTE AND DUPLICATION INHERENT IN NATO'S OVERLAPPING NATIONAL R&D AND ARMAMENTS INDUSTRIES, AND PERMIT ECONOMIES OF SCALE, IT WILL RESULT IN WISER USE OF AVAILABLE RESOURCES. LASTLY, THERE ARE INSTANCES WHEN THE NEED FOR COMMONALITY IS SO OVERRIDING, AND THE COST OF THE TECHNOLOGY INVOLVED SO GREAT, THAT THERE IS NO POINT IN ANYTHING BUT COMMON PROCUREMENT (FOR EXAMPLE, NADGE AND NICS). THUS THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT GREATER COMMONALITY IS MORE COST EFFECTIVE.

- BUT WE ARE ON SHAKIER GROUND IN ARGUING THAT IT WILL ALSO SAVE A LOT OF MONEY, AT LEAST IN THE SHORT RUN. IT IS PRECISELY HERE WHERE PAROCHIAL NATIONAL INTERESTS -- PRESTIGE, PROTECTING HOME INDUSTRY AND LABOR, MINIMIZING BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEFICITS, SHIELDING TECHNOLOGY, DESIRE FOR THIRD COUNTRY SALES -- POSE THE GREATEST OBSTACLES. BECAUSE THESE OBSTACLES ARE LARGELY BEYOND THE PURVIEW OF DEFENSE MINISTERS (THEY INVOLVE PARLIAMENTS, INDUSTRY, LABOR, OTHER MINISTRIES), THEY WILL UNQUESTION-

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ABLY BE THE HARDEST TO OVERCOME. IN THE PAST ALMOST EVERY NATO PRODUCTION SHARING OR OFFSET SCHEME HAS ENTAILED SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER COST THAN SOLE SOURCE PROCUREMENT.

IN SOME INDIVIDUAL CASES IT HAS RUN 20-25 MORE.

- BUT REAPING ALL THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF FULL STANDARDIZATION AND COMMON LEAST COST PROCUREMENT WILL ENTAIL SUCH FAR-REACHING RANGES IN NATIONAL PRACTICES AS TO BE A LONG TERM PROPOSITION AT BEST. IN THE LAST ANALYSIS, EVENTUAL PROCUREMENT OF STANDARDIZED EQUIPMENT AT LEAST COST WILL REQUIRE EXTENSIVE RATIONALIZATION OF NATO R&D AND DEFENSE INDUSTRY. THIS IS A TALL ORDER.

C. THE EXISTING PIECEMEAL APPROACH WILL NOT MEET THE NEED.

- AT PRESENT S/I IS A HIT-OR-MISS PROPOSITION. IT OCCURS MOSTLY WHEN PRODUCER NATIONS PERCEIVE SALES OPPORTUNITIES OR CUSTOMER NATIONS HAVE A REQUIREMENT (USUALLY FOR REPLACEMENT OF OBSOLETE SYSTEMS). THUS THE PROCESS IS DRIVEN MORE BY COMMERCIAL CONSIDERATIONS THAN ACCORDING TO ANY RATIONAL PLAN. ONLY IN A FEW CASES LIKE NADGE OR NICS WAS A PERCEIVED NATO REQUIREMENT THE PRIMARY INCENTIVE. OTHER CASES ARE MIXED; AWACS FOR EXAMPLE WAS PARTIALLY DRIVEN BY A FELT NEED. MOREOVER, WHEN CNAD AND ITS MANY SUBGROUPS HAVE TRIED TO GENERATE COOPERATIVE R&D AND EVEN PROCUREMENT, IT HAS BEEN MOSTLY ON AN ITEM-BY-ITEM BASIS. THIS IS ADMITTEDLY BETTER THAN NOTHING. BUT IS IT GOOD ENOUGH? AMONG OTHER THINGS, WE MAY BE CONCENTRATING ON LESS ESSENTIAL ITEMS, OFTEN JUST BECAUSE AN OPPORTUNITY EMERGES, WHILE NEGLECTING HIGHER PRIORITY (THOUGH LESS TRACTABLE) NEEDS. MOREOVER, SUCH PIECEMEAL APPROACHES

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TEND TO MAXIMIZE COSTS AND OBSCURE LARGER ADVANTAGES.

- PERHAPS THE MOST SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO DATE HAS BEEN THAT OF THE NAC AD HOC COMMITTEE ON INTEROPERABILITY, WHICH OVER THE LAST 18 MONTHS HAS FOCUSED ON FIVE SELECTED AREAS (TACTICAL COMMO, TACTICAL AIRCRAFT REARMING, FUELS, TANK AMMO, AND STANAGS). BUT NATIONAL HESITATIONS IN THIS FORUM ILLUSTRATE THE DIFFICULTIE IN TACKLING AGREED HIGH PRIORITY PROBLEMS SYSTEMATICALLY. IN ANY CASE, IT IS THE EXCEPTION WHICH PROVES THE RULE.

- ANOTHER REFLECTION (OR CAUSE) OF THE PIECEMEAL APPROACH HAS BEEN NATIONAL REFUSAL TO IMPLEMENT COMMON MILITARY REQUIREMENTS. THEORETICALLY, THESE SHOULD DRIVE THE PROCESS. IN FACT NATO'S MILITARY AGENCY FOR STANDARDIZATION (MAS) MANAGED TO PROMULGATE DURING 1959-65 OVER FIFTY NATO BASIC MILITARY REQUIREMENTS (NBMRS). BUT THESE WERE SO SEDULUOUSLY IGNORED BY MOST ALLIES THAT THE SCHEME WAS DROPPED IN 1966 IN FAVOR OF ASSIGNING THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR S/I AND CO-PROCUREMENT TO A NEW HIGHER LEVEL CIVILIAN COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL ARMAMENTS DIRECTORS (CNAD).

D. ON THE OTHER HAND S/I DOES NOT REQUIRE NATO-WIDE AGREEMENT.
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- FOUR ALLIES (US, UK, FRG, AND FRANCE) DO THE GREAT BULK OF THE R&D AND PRODUCE 80-85 OF THE EQUIPMENT IN NATO. THREE OTHER COUNTRIES (ITALY, BELGIUM, NETHERLANDS) COMPRISE THE NEXT ESCHOLON. THUS S/I IS LARGELY A FOUR COUNTRY OR AT MOST A SEVEN COUNTRY PROPOSITION. FLEXIBILITY SHOULD BE THE KEY. RATHER THAN HOLDING EVERYTHING UP UNTIL NATO-WIDE CONSENSUS CAN BE REACHED, IT MAKES SENSE TO GO AHEAD WITH AS MANY ALLIES AS CAN BE PERSUADED TO JOIN IN EACH CASE.

II. INSTITUTIONALIZE A NATO R&D AND PROCUREMENT PROCESS.

- ONE MAJOR WAY TO DRIVE THE COMMONALITY PROCESS IN NATO IS TO INSTITUTIONALIZE IT. AT PRESENT THERE IS NO COMMON NATO R&D OR PROCUREMENT CONCEPT, PLAN, OR PROGRAM -- ONLY NATIONAL ONES. UNLESS WE CREATE ONE, THERE WILL BE NO BASIS ON WHICH TO HARMONIZE, MUCH LESS INTEGRATE NATIONAL PLANS, ALLOCATE RESOURCES RATIONALLY, AND ACHIEVE S/I. THE NEED FOR COMMONALITY IS SO GREAT THAT NATO CAN NO LONGER AFFORD TO SUB-OPTIMIZE THE USE OF SCARCE RESOURCES BY TOO MUCH OF A PIECEMEAL APPROACH -- AS IS THE NORM TODAY. ERGO, WE NEED SOME MEANS OF NATO-IZING NATIONAL R&D AND PROCUREMENT PROGRAMS -- OF GETTING THEM TO CONFORM BETTER TO OVERALL COALITION NEEDS. UNTIL SOME KIND OF A NATO PROGRAM IS DEVELOPED THERE WILL NOT EVEN BE A YARD-

STICK AGAINST WHICH TO MEASURE (AND CRITIQUE) NATIONAL PROGRAMS.

- THE NATO LONG RANGE DEFENSE PROGRAM (LRDP), BLESSED BY THE NATO MINISTERS, IS AN ADMIRABLE VEHICLE TO THIS END. IT IS SUPPOSED TO LOOK OUT AHEAD FAR ENOUGH TO ENCOMPASS WHAT WILL NECESSARILY BE A LENGTHY PROCESS, AND IT IS FLEXIBLE ENOUGH TO ACCOMMODATE RELATED ONGOING NATO CONFIDENTIAL

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EFFORTS THAT WILL CONTRIBUTE TO S/I (E.G., PAPS, FLEXIBILITY PROGRAMS, FORCE GOALS). IF THIS EXERCISE GOES ACCORDING TO PLAN, IT WILL INCLUDE SPECIFIC STANDARDIZED HARDWARE OPTIONS AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE HIGH PRIORITY PROGRAM PACKAGES COMPRISING THE LRDP. BUT HOW DO THESE GET MULTILATERALLY EXECUTED IN CONCRETE TERMS? HERE IS WHERE PAPS COMES IN.

- THE STEPS NECESSARY TO CREATING AN INSTITUTIONALIZED NATO R&D AND ARMAMENTS PLANNING/PROGRAMMING PROCESS ARE PRESENTED BELOW IN LOGICAL ORDER. BUT TO APPROACH THEM SERIATIM WOULD LEAD TO INORDINATE DELAY. INSTEAD THEY SHOULD ALL BE ADDRESSED SIMULTANEOUSLY IN THE COURSE OF DEVELOPING THIS PORTION OF THE LRDP.

A. DECIDE FIRST ON WHAT MOST URGENTLY NEEDS TO BE STANDARDIZED OR AT LEAST INTEROPERABLE.

- THIS IS THE FIRST KEY QUESTION. BUT NOT MUCH WORK IS BEING DONE ON IT (WHICH CONTRIBUTES TO OUR SUB-OPTIMAL PIECEMEAL APPROACH TO S/I). SO LET'S START BY ANALYZING WHAT THE BROAD PRIORITY NEEDS FOR S/I REALLY ARE, IN TERMS OF OPTIMUM COALITION WARFIGHTING CAPABILITY. IN SOME CASES ONLY INTEROPERABILITY IS NEEDED, IN OTHERS PERHAPS NEITHER. WE DON'T NEED THE SAME DEGREE OF S/I IN ALL GEOGRAPHIC AREAS.

B. NEXT DEFINE COMMON MILITARY REQUIREMENTS.

- AMONG OTHER THINGS, NATO MUST TRY TO DEVELOP REQUIREMENTS BASED ON THE SORT OF PRIORITIES CALLED FOR IN A ABOVE. THIS IS LOGICALLY THE NEXT STEP IN THE PROCESS.

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WITH THE NEW STRESS ON S/I IN NATO IT IS AGAIN BEING PRES-
SED BY NATO'S MILITARY AUTHORITIES. THE MILITARY COMMITTEE
RECOMMENDED IN NOVEMBER 1975 THAT NATO DEVELOP A LONG-TERM
CYCLICAL ARMAMENTS PLANNING PROCESS WHICH WOULD INCLUDE A
PROCESS FOR DEFINITION OF COMMON NATO EQUIPMENT REQUIRE-
MENTS. BUT PAST EXPERIENCE SHOWS HOW HARD THIS IS TO DO
COLLEGIALLY IN SUFFICIENTLY PRECISE FORM TO SERVE AS A
GUIDE TO ACTION (IN FACT, IT'S HARD ENOUGH TO DEVELOP SUCH
REQUIREMENTS NATIONALLY). THE FAILURE OF THE NBMR APPROACH
OF THE EARLY 1960S LEFT A BAD TASTE IN THE MOUTHS OF MANY.
THE NMBRS EITHER IGNORED THE NEEDS AND DESIRES OF NATIONS
OR ELSE BECAME TOP-HEAVY WITH NICE TO HAVE, BUT NOT REALLY
NECESSARY, FEATURES, OR BOTH. FRESH ATTEMPTS TO DEAL WITH
THIS AREA MUST ENVISION MACHINERY WHICH CAN BOTH TAKE
NATIONAL VIEWS INTO ADEQUATE ACCOUNT AND ACCOMMODATE THE
HARD REALITIES. THEY MUST BE FLEXIBLE AND CAPABLE OF
EVOLUTION AND ADJUSTMENT. EVEN A FIRST APPROXIMATION WILL
BE HELPFUL.

C. DEVELOP AN OVERALL NATO R&D AND ARMAMENTS PROGRAM TO
HARMONIZE NATIONAL PROGRAMS FOR MEETING THE ABOVE NEEDS.

- THE THIRD STEP MUST BE TO PULL TOGETHER DISPARATE
NATIONAL PROGRAMS ACCORDING TO SOME RATIONAL PATTERN. THIS
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IS THE HEART OF THE PROBLEM -- AND OF ANY PAPS. EVEN IF
WE END UP STILL DEALING WITH R&D AND CO-PROCUREMENT MOSTLY
ON AN ITEM-BY-ITEM BASIS, LET'S AT LEAST TRY TO DO SO IN
CONFORMANCE WITH SOME OVERALL COLLECTIVE NATO PLAN. THIS
IS WHAT PAPS IS SUPPOSED TO DO. AT THE MINIMUM IT IS SUP-
POSED TO COLLATE NATIONAL ARMAMENTS REQUIREMENTS AND PRO-
POSED EQUIPMENT SCHEDULES, LOOKING OUT AS FAR AHEAD AS
NECESSARY FOR THIS PURPOSE -- AT LEAST 10 TO 15 YEARS.
EVEN THIS COLLATING JOB WOULD BE A STEP FORWARD, SINCE IT

WOULD SHOW THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR S/I -- AND THE RISKS OF THE REVERSE. THEN AT LEAST THE OVERLAP AND DUPLICATION IN NATIONAL PROGRAMS COULD BE POINTED OUT, AND THE NEED FOR S/I IDENTIFIED.

- BUT A PAPS WHICH STOPS HERE IS FAR FROM GOOD ENOUGH. IT SHOULD ALSO INCLUDE MACHINERY AND PROCEDURES FOR PROPOSING WHAT NATO SHOULD DO ABOUT THESE S/I OPPORTUNITIES. IF PAPS MUST BECOME THE VEHICLE FOR HARMONIZING NATIONAL PROGRAMS AND AVOIDING THE PIECEMEAL APPROACH, A MATRIX MUST BE DEVELOPED WHICH WOULD FACILITATE MORE SENSIBLE HORSETRADING AMONG NATIONAL PROGRAMS. THEN AT LEAST RELEVANT NATIONAL R&D AND PROCUREMENT PROGRAMS COULD BE MATCHED AGAINST SOME PROPOSED NATO YARDSTICK, AND NATIONAL MULTILATERAL SOLUTIONS PROPOSED.

- HERE WE GET INTO THE SENSITIVE PROBLEM OF DOVETAILING NATIONAL R&D AND PROCUREMENT PROGRAMS INTO SOME RATIONAL COLLECTIVE WHOLE. IF PAST EXPERIENCE IS ANY GUIDE THE PRODUCT OF A PAPS PROCESS, LEFT TO SINK OR SWIM IN NATO, WOULD BID FAIR TO REMAIN (LIKE SO MUCH OTHER NATO PLANNING) LARGELY A STERILE PAPER PLANNING EXERCISE WITHOUT MORE THAN MARGINAL INFLUENCE ON NATIONAL PROGRAMS. THEREFORE, PAPS MUST BECOME AN INTEGRAL PART OF A LONG-RANGE NATO CONFIDENTIAL

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DEFENSE PROGRAM WHICH WOULD OFFER PROGRAMMATIC SOLUTIONS FOR MINISTERIAL REVIEW. ONLY AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL WOULD SUCH SOLUTIONS HAVE MUCH CHANCE OF BEING BOUGHT.

- EVEN SO, LET'S NOT EXPECT TOO MUCH FROM NATO. SO LONG AS IT REMAINS A COALITION OF SOVEREIGN STATES, NATIONAL PROGRAMS WILL INFLUENCE ANY COLLECTIVE NATO ONE MUCH MORE THAN THE REVERSE. THE BEST NATO CAN DO IS TO NUDGE THESE PROGRAMS IN THE DIRECTION OF COMMONALITY. TO DO SO WILL REQUIRE A GROWING PROCESS OF INTERACTION BETWEEN NATO AND NATIONAL PLANNING/PROGRAMMING. THUS AT THE SAME TIME AS WE TRY TO CREATE A NATO R&D AND ARMAMENTS PROCESS, WE MUST STRIVE TO NATO-IZE THE RELATED NATIONAL PROCESSES (WHICH MAKE UP ITS BUILDING BLOCKS) MORE EFFECTIVELY THAN BEFORE.

D. TRY TO DEVELOP A COORDINATED R&D PROGRAM.

- NATO'S CONSTRAINED R&D RESOURCES NEED BETTER FOCUSSED TO AVOID WASTEFUL OVERLAP AND DUPLICATION. AS PART OF PAPS WE SHOULD TRY TO RATIONALIZE THEIR USE BY AGREEMENT THAT CERTAIN COUNTRIES WOULD DO CERTAIN PROJECTS, OR EVEN JOIN IN COMMON R&D EFFORTS IN SOME CASES. CNAD MAKES A STAB AT THIS NOW, BUT IT DOESN'T ADD UP TO MUCH. MAKING THIS PART OF THE LRDP OR A FOLLOW-ON TASK WOULD BE USEFUL.

E. USE PAPS TO DEVELOP COMMON PROGRAM PACKAGES FOR KEY SYSTEMS.

- HERE IS ANOTHER FACET OF THE LRDP (ACCEPTED AT LEAST IN PRINCIPLE BY THE ALLIES) WHICH CAN HELP INSTITUTIONALIZE A NATO R&D AND PROCUREMENT PROCESS. SUCH PACKAGES CAN BE STIMULATED BY A PAPS AND IN TURN CONTRIBUTE TO IT, THUS

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HELPING LOCK NATIONS INTO COMMON PROGRAMS.
F. DEVELOP COMMON TEST AND EVALUATION STANDARDS AND IF POSSIBLE COMMON FACILITIES.

- THIS TOO SHOULD BE PART OF PAPS.

G. KEEP FOCUS ON INTEROPERABILITY.

- RETAINING AND REVITALIZING THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THIS SUBJECT WOULD KEEP PRESSURE ON NATIONS AND CNAD. IT HAS BEEN QUITE USEFUL SO FAR. MOREOVER, IT INCLUDES FRANCE. BUT THE MAIN THRUST TOWARD INTEROPERABILITY WILL HAVE TO COME FROM CNAD VIA THE PAPS.

H. DEVELOP NATO MACHINERY FOR CONFIGURATION CONTROL.

- THIS IS ESSENTIAL TO KEEP S/I FROM BEING SUBSEQUENTLY UNDERCUT BY UNILATERAL NATIONAL MODIFICATIONS. PERHAPS IT SHOULD BE MADE PART OF PAPS.

III. DEVELOP SUITABLE MACHINERY FOR THE ABOVE PURPOSES.

- SO FAR THE EMPHASIS HAS BEEN ON TECHNIQUES FOR INSTI-
TUTIONALIZING THE COMMONALITY PROCESS. BUT EXPERIENCE
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SHOWS THAT NOT MUCH WILL HAPPEN UNLESS WE CREATE NEW
MACHINERY AND PROCEDURES -- BOTH NATIONALLY AND IN NATO --
FOR EXPLOITING THESE TECHNIQUES. SUCH MACHINERY DOES NOT
REALLY EXIST TODAY, OR WHERE IT DOES IT HAS BEEN DEMON-
STRABLY INEFFECTIVE.

A. STRENGTHEN THE ABILITY OF THE NATO BUREAUCRACY TO SPUR
THE S/I AND HARMONIZATION PROCESS.

- HOWEVER NATIONALLY BIASED, THE CNAD STRUCTURE IS
INDISPENSABLE, SINCE NATIONS WILL NECESSARILY RETAIN THE
ULTIMATE POWER OF DECISION IN A COALITION OF SOVEREIGN
STATES LIKE NATO. BUT THE CNAD ALONE, BEING A COMMITTEE
OF NATIONAL REPRESENTATIVES, CANNOT BE RELIED UPON TO
DRIVE THE COMMONALITY PROCESS ALONE. THE ELABORATE NETWORK
OF COMMITTEES AND WORKING GROUPS SUFFERS FROM THE SAME
DISABILITY OF BEING STAFFED BY NATIONAL REPRESENTATIVES
REFLECTING MOSTLY PAROCHIAL NATIONAL VIEWPOINTS. THUS THE
BEST SOLUTION, PARTIAL THOUGH IT MAY BE, IS TO STRENGTHEN
THE INFLUENCE OF THE NATO BUREAUCRACY OVER THE CNAD. THE
COORDINATING AND INITIATING ROLE OF THE CHAIRMAN SHOULD BE
STRENGTHENED, AND HIS STAFF MODESTLY EXPANDED (IT IS WHOLLY
INADEQUATE NOW). THE COST OF DOING SO IS MINUTE COMPARED
TO THE POTENTIAL GAIN.

B. DEVISE PROCEDURES TO FORCE CONSISTENT MINISTERIAL LEVEL
FOCUS ON KEY ISSUES.

- EVEN NATIONAL ARMAMENTS DIRECTORS LACK SUFFICIENT
CLOUT TO COMMIT THEIR GOVERNMENTS. SEVERAL OF THEM ARE NOT
CHIEF PROCUREMENT EXECUTIVES. ONLY AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL
CAN MOST PAINFUL DECISIONS BE TAKEN. SO MINISTERS MUST BE
KEPT INVOLVED VIA SYSTEMATIC PROCEDURES FOR RAISING SUCH
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ISSUES TO THE POLITICAL LEVEL, SUCH AS A PROPOSAL FOR
REQUIRING EACH DPC MINISTERIAL SESSION TO CONSIDER AT LEAST
TWO ISSUES RAISED BY CNAD. ONLY SUCH ADMITTEDLY ARBITRARY
PROCEDURES WILL MEET THE NEED.

C. STRENGTHEN THE MAS.

- CREATED IN 1951, MAS HAS FOCUSED MOSTLY ON "SOFTWARE", PROMULGATING TO DATE OVER 600 STANDARDIZATION AGREEMENTS (STANAGS) ON DOCTRINE, PROCEDURES, AND SOME EQUIPMENT PARAMETERS. BUT THESE STANAGS HAVE OFTEN BEEN CRITICIZED AS TOO GENERALIZED (BECAUSE OF NEED TO GET ALLIED AGREEMENT). AT PRESENT MAS HAS LITTLE CLOUT AND NOT MUCH MORE ENERGY. IT HAS BEEN AN ORPHAN CHILD OF NATO. THE MC RECENTLY STRENGTHENED IT, BUT FAR FROM ENOUGH. THE MAS SHOULD BE CHARGED, IN ADDITION TO PRESENT FUNCTIONS, WITH (1) IMPLEMENTING A MILITARY REQUIREMENTS CONCEPT; (2) DEVELOPING COMMON TEST AND EVALUATION STANDARDS; AND (3) RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONFIGURATION CONTROL.

D. BE FLEXIBLE IN CHOOSING WHICH FORUM TO USE.

- THERE IS NO SINGLE FORUM IN WHICH TO PURSUE S/I OR PRODUCTION SHARING. THE NAC, CNAD, FOUR POWER CNAD, NMAS, EUROGROUP, EPG, AND POTENTIALLY OTHERS ALL HAVE A SHARE OF THE PIE. NOR IS IT PROFITABLE AT THIS POINT TO DIVERT UNDUE ENERGY TO TRYING TO RATIONALIZE THIS CHAOTIC SITUATION. LET THIS EVOLVE NATURALLY INSTEAD. WHILE THE PAPS SHOULD BE USED AS AN OVERALL PARAMETRIC DESIGN OF WHAT IS NEEDED, IN ACTUAL PROJECT NEGOTIATIONS WE SHOULD FLEXIBLY EMPLOY WHATEVER FORUM SEEMS LIKELY TO PRODUCE THE OPTIMUM RESULT.

IV. RECOMMENDED NATO ACTION PROGRAMS

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- A NATO ACTION PROGRAM, BASED ON THE OBJECTIVES SPECIFIED IN THE RATIONALIZATION TASK FORCE TERMS OF REFERENCE, AC/281(LTP)-D(77)8, SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:
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A. PREPARATION AND PRIORITIZATION OF OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS AS AN INPUT FOR NATIONAL ACQUISITION PLANS.

1. TO STRENGTHEN NATO EFFORTS TO DEVELOP COMMON OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS, MAKE THE MILITARY AGENCY FOR STANDARDIZATION (MAS) THE NATO AGENT FOR ALL MATTERS RELATING TO OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS. GIVE THE MAS RESPONSIBILITY WITHIN NATO FOR THE INITIAL TRANSLATION OF OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS, DEVELOPED BY THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES, INTO BROAD OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS. PHASE THE CNAD OUT OF THE PREPARATION OF TACTICAL DOCTRINE AND OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS AS THE MAS CAPABILITY IS PHASED IN. WHEN STATE-OF-THE-ART ADVANCEMENTS INDICATE A NEED FOR ADDITIONAL DOCTRINAL AND CONCEPTUAL GUIDANCE UPON WHICH TO BASE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (R&D) ACTIVITIES, THE CNAD SHOULD ADVISE THE MAS. BY THE SAME TOKEN, LONG RANGE OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS SHOULD BE FORMULATED WITHIN THE MAS AND PROVIDED TO THE CNAD AS A GUIDE FOR LONG RANGE R&D ACTIVITIES.

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2. TO ESTABLISH A REGULAR PROCEDURE AND MECHANISM FOR DETERMINING COMMON MILITARY REQUIREMENTS, MAS AND CNAD TOGETHER WOULD PREPARE NATO MISSION ELEMENT NEED STATEMENTS (MENS) IN RESPONSE TO EQUIPMENT DEFICIENCIES, TECHNOLOGICAL OPPORTUNITIES, OR INABILITY TO CARRY OUT CURRENT AND LONGER RANGE OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES WITH EXISTING OR PROGRAMMED EQUIPMENT. DRAWING ON PRIORITIZED ASSESSMENTS BY NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES, THE NEED STATEMENTS WOULD SPECIFY THE REQUIRED LEVEL OF STANDARDIZATION/INTEROPERABILITY.

3. TO ENSURE NEW WEAPON SYSTEMS DEVELOPED BY NATIONS WILL PROVIDE NATO THE REQUIRED STANDARDIZATION OR INTEROPERABILITY WITH EXISTING OR ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS WHICH MAY BE FIELDDED, CNAD OR MAS WOULD PREPARE APPROPRIATE STANAGS. THE MENS WOULD IDENTIFY AREAS OF NEEDED COMPATIBILITY/COMMONALITY AMONG COMPETING NATIONAL ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS AS WELL AS WITH EXISTING (OR ALREADY PLANNED) SYSTEMS. THE CNAD PLANS WOULD INCLUDE THE PREPARATION OF APPROPRIATE STANAGS TO ENSURE COMMONALITY NOT ONLY WITH EXISTING (OR ALREADY PLANNED) SYSTEMS, BUT ALSO AMONG ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS IN THE EVENT TWO OR MORE ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS ARE ULTIMATELY FIELDDED. INTERFACES, MESSAGE STANDARDS, ETC. AFFECTING INTEROPERABILITY SHOULD BE FINALIZED AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE TO MINIMIZE THE COST AND SCHEDULE IMPACT ON NATIONAL ACQUISITION PROGRAMS.

B. COORDINATED LONG-TERM ACQUISITION PLANNING AND SCHEDUL-

ING, AND THE DOVETAILING OF THESE ACQUISITION PLANS WITH
THE NORMAL NATO FORCE PLANNING PROCESS.

1. THE REPORT (AC/259-D/591) OF THE CNAD AD HOC STUDY
GROUP ON A PERIODIC ARMAMENTS PLANNING SYSTEM (PAPS)
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ACKNOWLEDGES THAT ITS REPORT COVERS A NATO ARMAMENTS
PLANNING REVIEW (NAPR) AND THAT FOLLOW-ON WORK ON THE
WIDER ISSUES OF A POSSIBLE PERIODIC ARMAMENTS PLANNING
SYSTEM IS NECESSARY. THIS FOLLOW-ON WORK SHOULD ADDRESS A
SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO GENERATING MISSION CONCEPTS BASED
ON THREAT ASSESSMENTS, LEADING TO A SERIES OF COORDINATED
NATO MILITARY REQUIREMENTS UPON WHICH LONG-TERM EQUIPMENT
DEVELOPMENT COULD BE BASED.

2. MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE (1977) DIRECTS NATO CIVIL AND
MILITARY AUTHORITIES, IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH NATIONAL
AUTHORITIES, TO SEEK TO HARMONIZE PLANNING MECHANISMS FOR
THE VARIOUS COOPERATIVE AND SUPPORTING PROGRAMS, AND TO
DOVETAIL THE RESULTS OF THIS EFFORT WITH THE PRESENT NATO
FORCE PLANNING PROCEDURES IN A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO
ALLIANCE DEFENSE PLANNING.

3. COMMON NATO R&D OR PROCUREMENT CONCEPTS SHOULD BE
DEVELOPED. BUILDING ON THE NAPR SCHEDULES, A MATRIX OF
NATIONAL EQUIPMENT PLANS COULD BE DOVETAILED INTO A
RATIONAL COLLECTIVE WHOLE TO OFFER PROGRAMMATIC SOLUTIONS,
I.E. BUYS VERSUS SALES, FOR MINISTERIAL REVIEW.

C. PROCEDURES, NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL, TO ENSURE
THAT NATIONALLY DEVELOPED ARMAMENTS MEET APPROPRIATE NATO
INTEROPERABILITY/STANDARDIZATION REQUIREMENTS.

1. IN DEVELOPING COORDINATED NATO MILITARY REQUIREMENTS
ON WHICH NATIONAL EQUIPMENT DEVELOPMENT COULD BE BASED,
NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES MUST SPECIFY THE MINIMUM ACCEPT-
ABLE DEGREE OF STANDARDIZATION/INTEROPERABILITY WHICH WILL

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MEET THE REQUIREMENTS -- TO INCLUDE, IN THE CASE OF
INTEROPERABILITY, GEOGRAPHIC CONSIDERATIONS WHICH BEAR ON
THE MILITARY REQUIREMENT, IF APPROPRIATE.

2. TO IMPROVE NATO'S MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS AND MAXIMIZE
ALLIANCE DEFENSE RESOURCES, COMMON LEAST-COST R&D AND
PROCUREMENT SHOULD DRIVE NATIONAL ARMAMENTS PROGRAMS.

THEREFORE, THE ALLIANCE NEEDS TO ENSURE THAT NATIONALLY
DEVELOPED ARMAMENTS MEET ESTABLISHED STANDARDIZATION/
INTEROPERABILITY CRITERIA.

3. A PERIODIC ARMAMENTS PLANNING SYSTEM SHOULD PROVIDE
MEASURES NOT ONLY TO COORDINATE NATIONAL PROGRAMS, BUT ALSO
TO ESTABLISH THE STANDARDIZATION/INTEROPERABILITY CRITERIA
WHICH NATIONS CAN ADOPT IN THEIR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS, E.G.
COMMON SPECIFICATIONS AND STANDARDS.

4. NATO MACHINERY FOR DEVELOPING STANDARDS, SPECIFICATIONS
CONFIGURATION CONTROL SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED, EXPANDED AND
UTILIZED, AND THUS PREVENT "NATIONALIZING" COMMON SYSTEMS.

5. WITHIN NATIONAL MINISTRIES OF DEFENSE, PROCEDURES
SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED WHICH REQUIRE AT EACH MILESTONE IN
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THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS OF A NEW SYSTEM, AN EVALUATION OF
THE EFFECT ON NATO STANDARDIZATION/INTEROPERABILITY.

D. IDENTIFICATION OF AREAS OF ARMAMENT DEVELOPMENT MOST
NEEDING SPECIAL EMPHASIS TO ACHIEVE STANDARDIZATION/
INTEROPERABILITY; TO INCLUDE ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION OF
PRIORITIES FOR INTEROPERABILITY AND STANDARDIZATION
ACCORDING TO OPERATIONAL AND OTHER BENEFITS.

1. AN ARMAMENTS PLANNING REVIEW PROCESS CAN IDENTIFY AND
HELP EXPLOIT OPPORTUNITIES FOR COMMON R&D AND PROCUREMENT.
HOWEVER, AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE REVIEW PROCESS IS

THE MILITARY INPUT WHICH NOT ONLY IDENTIFIES WHERE STANDARDIZATION/INTEROPERABILITY IS REQUIRED, BUT ALSO SPECIFIES THE AREAS OF ARMAMENTS DEVELOPMENT MOST URGENTLY IN NEED OF SPECIAL EMPHASIS FROM THE MILITARY POINT OF VIEW. PROPERLY INCORPORATED, THESE TWO ASPECTS OF THE MILITARY INPUT COULD MAKE THE ARMAMENTS PLANNING REVIEW MORE THAN A STERILE ANALYSIS, AND GIVE THE REVIEW THE ADDED DIMENSION OF PULLING TOGETHER THE NATIONAL PROGRAMS ACCORDING TO SOME RATIONAL PATTERN.

2. IN THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPING NATO MILITARY REQUIREMENTS -- IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING INPUT TO AN ARMAMENTS REVIEW PROCEDURE -- NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES SHOULD CONTINUALLY ANALYSE AND DETERMINE PRIORITIES FOR STANDARDIZATION/INTEROPERABILITY TO DRIVE THE COMMONALITY APPROACH TO ARMAMENTS DEVELOPMENT, E.G. A CONTINUOUS REVIEW AND EXPANSION OF THE BASIC BUILDING BLOCKS FOR STANDARDIZATION, THE SPECIFICATIONS AND STANDARDS CONTAINED IN STANAGS.

E. LICENSING, PATENT, AND INFORMATION CLASSIFICATION
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POLICIES TO ENCOURAGE INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION.

1. CNAD'S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GROUP (AC/94) IS STUDYING PROBLEMS IN THE FIELD OF LICENSING AND CO-PRODUCTION. THE AC/94 GROUP HAS DEFINED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AS ALL FORMS OF INTELLECTUAL OR TECHNICAL INFORMATION INCLUDING INVENTIONS, SPECIFICATIONS, DESIGNS, PRODUCTION PROCESSES OR TECHNIQUES, DRAWINGS, MODELS, PLANS, DOCUMENTS AND SOFTWARE. IN ITS PRELIMINARY STAGES, AC/94 HAS BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN GATHERING TOGETHER A COMPENDIUM OF IMPEDIMENTS TO STANDARDIZATION RELATED TO BOTH COMMERCIAL AND GOVERNMENT PRACTICES (AND IN SOME CASES TO NATIONAL LAWS) IN THE AREA OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY. WITH SUFFICIENT NATO AND NATIONAL EMPHASIS THE COMPENDIUM COULD BE USEFUL IN DEVELOPING A PROGRAM TO ESTABLISH NATO LICENSING AND CO-PRODUCTION POLICIES.

2. PROGRAMS TO DEAL WITH QUESTIONS OF DESIGNING TO COMMON STANDARDS UNDER LICENSE, FREER LICENSING POLICIES, E.G. LOW-COST NO-COST LICENSING, COMMON POLICY ON TECHNOLOGY RELEASE, CO-PRODUCTION AND OFFSET SCHEMES, ELIMINATION OF RESTRICTIVE NATIONAL LAWS AND PRACTICES TO FACILITATE CROSS-LICENSING, AND ADJUSTMENT TO ARMS TRANSFER RESTRAINTS ARE CLEARLY NECESSARY TO DRIVE NATO ARMAMENTS DEVELOPMENT TOWARD COMMONALITY, WHICH WILL ULTIMATELY LEAD TO IMPROVED STANDARDIZATION/INTEROPERABILITY AND MORE EFFICIENT USE OF ALLIANCE RESOURCES.

3. IN PURSUING THE ACTIONS IN 2. ABOVE, NATO SHOULD
CREATE, IF NECESSARY, OR REINFORCE CURRENT MACHINERY TO
ENSURE THAT AGREED POLICIES ON LICENSING AND CO-PRODUCTION
ARE LAID DOWN IN STANAGS.

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F. INCREASED UTILIZATION AND MONITORING OF THE NATO
STANDARDIZATION AGREEMENTS (STANAGS) IN THE NATIONAL
ARMAMENT DEVELOPMENT PROCESS.

1. TO ARRIVE AT A NATO POLICY FOR DESIGNING TO COMMON
STANDARDS AND SPECIFICATIONS, DEVELOPMENT, PROMULGATION,
AND UTILIZATION OF STANAGS BY NATIONS ARE ESSENTIAL ELE-
MENTS. THE RECENT NATO EFFORTS IN THE AREAS OF AN ARMA-
MENTS PLANNING REVIEW, ASSEMBLIES COMPONENTS SPARE PARTS
AND MATERIAL, AND CONFIGURATION CONTROL SHOULD BE BUILT
UPON. TO DO THIS, THE MILITARY AGENCY FOR STANDARDIZATION
SHOULD BE GIVEN THE CENTRAL ROLE AND THE CLOUT TO PURSUE
THE RECENT EFFORTS.

2. IN DEVELOPING AN OVERALL NATO R&D AND PROCUREMENT
PROGRAM TO HARMONIZE NATIONAL PROGRAMS, THE STANAG PROCESS
SHOULD PROVIDE THE BASIC BUILDING BLOCKS OF COMMON STAN-
DARDS AND SPECIFICATIONS. FURTHER, STANAGS SHOULD BE
DEVELOPED TO COVER COMMON OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
CRITERIA TO REDUCE NATIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR EXTENSIVE AND
COSTLY RETESTING OF SYSTEMS.

3. A SYSTEM OF COMMON OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS WILL
NECESSARILY DEMAND AN AGENCY TO TRANSLATE OPERATIONAL
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CONCEPTS INTO BROAD OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS ON WHICH TO BASE R&D ACTIVITIES. SUFFICIENTLY STRENGTHENED AND/OR RESTRUCTURED THE MAS COULD BE THE AGENT AND INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN THE MILITARY DEVELOPED OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS AND THE CNAD R&D RESPONSE.

4. IN THE PROCESS OF NEW WEAPON SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT, ADEQUATE ACCOUNT SHOULD BE GIVEN TO STANDARDIZATION/INTEROPERABILITY WITH EXISTING OR ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS WHICH MAY BE FIELDDED. A SUFFICIENTLY STRENGTHENED AND/OR RESTRUCTURED CNAD COULD IDENTIFY AREAS OF NEEDED COMPATABILITY/COMMONALITY TO INCLUDE THE PREPARATION OF APPROPRIATE STANAGS. THE PROPOSED ARMAMENTS PLANNING REVIEW SYSTEM COULD BE A MEANS OF STRENGTHENING CNAD TO RESPOND TO THIS STANAG REQUIREMENT.

5. THE QUALITY, ADEQUACY AND APPROPRIATENESS OF STANAGS WILL BE THE DETERMINING FACTOR IN IMPROVING THE UTILIZATION OF STANAGS IN NATIONAL ARMAMENTS DEVELOPMENT PROCESSES. NATIONAL REPRESENTATIVES TO MAS AND CNAD NEED TO HAVE AS THEIR UNDERLYING GOAL THE DESIRE TO ACHIEVE STANDARDIZATION/INTEROPERABILITY THROUGH A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO ARMAMENTS DEVELOPMENT WHICH TAKES SUFFICIENT ACCOUNT OF THE NATO OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS.

G. INCREASE IN MULTINATIONAL HARDWARE PROCUREMENT BY AUGMENTATION OF THE CURRENT INFRASTRUCTURE METHOD; PROPOSALS FOR MODIFICATION IN THE PROCEDURES FOR COMMON PROCUREMENT WHICH WOULD MAKE COMMON PROCUREMENT MORE WIDELY ACCEPTABLE.

1. NATIONS COULD MORE WIDELY ACCEPT COMMON PROCUREMENT, IF ADEQUATE PROVISION IS MADE IN NATO FOR SUCH THINGS AS:

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COMMON OPERATIONAL TESTING STANDARDS ON WHICH NATIONS CAN JUDGE THE ADEQUACY OF THE EQUIPMENT FOR THEIR NEEDS; COMMON SPECIFICATIONS AND STANDARDS TO WHICH THE EQUIPMENT IS DESIGNED AND PRODUCED; AND REASONABLE LICENSING AND CO-PRODUCTION ARRANGEMENTS.

2. COMMON LEAST-COST R&D AND PROCUREMENT CONCEPTS SHOULD BE DEVELOPED BY NATO TO FOSTER MORE EFFICIENT UTILIZATION OF ALLIANCE RESOURCES, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME PROVIDING A RESPONSE TO AN OVERRIDING MILITARY NEED. SHARED DESIGN

AND PRODUCTION CAN DRIVE THE AFFORDABILITY OF SUCH A SYSTEM WHICH WOULD OTHERWISE BE UNOBTAINABLE IF DEVELOPED ON A NATIONAL BASIS. ADDITIONALLY, STANDARDIZATION/INTER-OPERABILITY ASPECTS OF EQUIPMENT COMMONLY FUNDED AND BUILT TO NATO COMMON SPECIFICATIONS AND STANDARDS ARE ENSURED.

H. CONFIGURATION CONTROL OF STANDARDIZED AND INTEROPERABLE SYSTEMS.

1. HAVING ATTAINED A STANDARDIZED OR, AT A MINIMUM, INTEROPERABLE SYSTEM, NATO SHOULD ENSURE THAT CONFIGURATION CONTROL IS MAINTAINED TO PREVENT "NATIONALIZING" SYSTEMS. STANAGS OF SUFFICIENT QUALITY, ADEQUACY AND APPROPRIATENESS SHOULD PROVIDE THE FRAMEWORK FOR ANY NATO CONFIGURATION CONTROL PROGRAM. A STRENGTHENED MAS ORGANIZATION COULD HAVE A CONFIGURATION CONTROL BRANCH OR THE CURRENT CNAD ACTIVITY IN QUALITY ASSURANCE COULD BE EXPANDED AND STRENGTHENED TO ACCOMMODATE A NATO CONFIGURATION CONTROL PROGRAM.

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2. COMMON R&D AND PROCUREMENT CONCEPTS DEVELOPED BY NATO SHOULD TAKE APPROPRIATE ACCOUNT OF CONFIGURATION CONTROL. ALSO, ANY ACTIVITY UNDERTAKEN BY THE GROUP WORKING ON ASSEMBLIES, COMPONENTS, SPARE PARTS AND MATERIAL, GIVEN SUFFICIENT BACKING BY NATO AND NATIONAL AUTHORITIES, CAN GO A LONG WAY TOWARD ENSURING CONFIGURATION CONTROL AT THE COMPONENT LEVEL.

3. FREER LICENSING AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER POLICIES SHOULD ENABLE A CONFIGURATION CONTROL PROGRAM TO OPERATE EFFEC-

TIVELY BY CREATING A FAVORABLE ENVIRONMENT. IN ADDITION,
CONFIGURATION CONTROL SHOULD BE A PART OF ANY ARMAMENTS
PLANNING SYSTEM WHICH IS DESIGNED TO HARMONIZE NATIONAL
ARMAMENTS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS. END TEXT. GLITMAN

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